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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
Richard Frankel†
ABSTRACT
The misclassification of employees as independent contractors is one of the
most serious problems affecting the American workforce. It deprives workers of
important employee benefits, civil rights, and wage and hour protections, and
deprives the federal and state governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue
annually. While workers can seek redress in the courts, businesses are trying to take
away that right as well by forcing workers to submit their disputes to binding
mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Section 1 of the
FAA, however, creates an exemption for transportation workers, stating that
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged in interstate commerce.”
This term, the Supreme Court is poised to decide whether businesses can evade
this exemption by labeling their workers as independent contractors. In other words,
it will consider whether the phrase “contracts of employment” is limited to contracts
with workers who satisfy the legal definition of employee, or if it was intended to
apply to all transportation workers, including independent contractors. Although
the Court’s recent history of consistently issuing pro-arbitration decisions may
suggest that it is inclined to limit the exemption to employees, this article argues that
would be a mistake. The commonly-understood meaning of “contracts of
employment” at the time of the FAA’s adoption in 1925, the Act’s legislative history,
and policy concerns of preventing companies from intentionally mislabeling
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employees as independent contractors all favor interpreting Section 1 to apply to all
transportation workers, regardless of their status. Such a result is both consistent
with the FAA and can mitigate the ongoing exploitation of workers by their
employers.
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INTRODUCTION
More than 160 million Americans are part of the labor force.1 One
of the most significant questions affecting their livelihood is whether they
are considered employees or independent contractors. Whether a worker
is classified as an employee or an independent contractor affects their
access to employee benefits, health insurance and unemployment
compensation.2 Employees, but not independent contractors, receive the
1 Labor Force Statistics from Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS.
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11000000 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/S8MB-RDH8.
2 Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://
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protections of anti-discrimination laws, the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA), and federal labor law.3 The classification of workers also
has larger macroeconomic effects. Employers must withhold and pay
payroll taxes for their employees but need not do so for independent
contractors.4
In most circumstances, whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor is a question of law based on a variety of factors
that address the employer’s degree of control over the worker.5
Unfortunately, employers have strong incentives to classify workers as
independent contractors, even if the workers meet the legal definition of
an employee. By labeling a hired worker as an independent contractor,
employers can avoid taxes, exempt themselves from civil rights and labor
laws, and deny their workers many important protections including “the
minimum wage, overtime compensation, family and medical leave,
unemployment insurance, and safe workplaces.”6
According to the United States Department of Labor, “the
misclassification of employees as independent contractors” is “one of the
most serious problems facing affected workers, employers and the entire
economy.”7 Some studies estimate between ten and thirty percent of
employers misclassify workers and that millions of workers are
mislabeled as independent contractors.8 The federal government
estimates that misclassification likely has deprived it of over a billion
dollars annually in lost tax revenue.9
For the tens of millions of individuals who work in the transportation

www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification (last visited Sept. 10, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/7MST-8HC5.
3 See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987–1 C.B. 296, 298–299 (describing
the IRS’s test for determining employee or independent contractor status for tax purposes).
6 Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://
www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification (last visited Sept. 10, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/54PM-88EV.
7 Id. This language originally appeared on the Department of Labor’s website. See https://
web.archive.org/web/20161219231838/https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification,
archived at https://perma.cc/54ZN-QRLF. The Trump administration has since removed it.
8 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES
HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES 1–2 (July 2015), http://
www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Independent-Contractor-Costs.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
G3FC-829L; FRANCOISE CARRÉ, EPI BRIEFING PAPER #403: (IN)DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
MISCLASSIFICATION 1, 10 (ECON. POL’Y INST. June 8, 2015), http:// www.epi.org/files/pdf/
87595.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/E2SL-TBV5.
9 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-656, EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS:
IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 2 (2006), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06656.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2T5J-ABL8; The Cost of
Misclassification: Government, MBO PARTNERS (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.mbopartners.com/
blog/the-cost-of-misclassification-government, archived at https://perma.cc/TW55-7LDP
(describing how federal and state governments estimate losses caused by employee
misclassification).

104

C ARD O Z O L AW RE VI EW D E• N O VO

[2018

sector,10 one additional and important effect of classifying workers as
independent contractors is that those workers can lose their constitutional
right to go to court.11 Under a federal law known as the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),12 mandatory arbitration agreements that require
parties to give up their right to bring a dispute in court and instead resolve
it through private arbitration are generally enforceable and binding.13
However, Section 1 of the Act provides an exemption for “contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”14 Although it is likely that
Section 1 was intended to exempt all workers,15 the U.S. Supreme Court
has limited the reach of the provision to workers engaged in the channels
of commerce—i.e. transportation workers.16
What the Supreme Court left undecided was the question of which
transportation workers were exempt from the Act: in other words,
whether the phrase “contracts of employment” in Section 1 covers only
contracts with employees or whether it covers contracts with all
transportation workers, including both employees and independent
contractors. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on that
question and will decide it during the Court’s upcoming 2018–19 term.17
This question is of great importance. If Section 1 is limited to
employees, then transportation companies can rely on the FAA to force
10 According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, 13 million people worked in the
transportation sector in 2016, comprising nearly 9% of the U.S. labor force. U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, TRANSPORTATION ECONOMIC TRENDS 2017 46
(2017), https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/docs/browse-statistical-products-and-data/btspublications/215901/transportation-economic-trends-2017.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
M4BE-7CJR.
11 The Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a trial by jury in civil lawsuits in most
circumstances. U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
12 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
13 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating that written agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”); see also Epic Systs. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (“In the Federal
Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according
to their terms.”).
14 9 U.S.C. § 1.
15 See, e.g., IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE 191–92 (2013) (examining the history
surrounding the adoption of the FAA and concluding that the drafters intended to exempt all
workplace disputes from the Act); Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the United
States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L.
282 (1996) (same). But see William F. Kolakowsi III, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act and
Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just End, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2171
(1995) (arguing that Section 1 should be limited to transportation workers).
16 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
17 See New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018) (granting certiorari of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017), which
held that Section 1’s exemption applies to both employees and independent contractors).
Disclosure: I submitted an Amicus Curiae brief in support of Oliveira when the case was before the
First Circuit, and I serve as co-counsel for amici curiae historians before the Supreme Court. See
Brief of Amici Curiae Historians in Support of Respondent, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, No. 17340, (U.S. July 25, 2018). The statements in this article are my own.
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their workers into binding arbitration simply by labeling them as
independent contractors. Mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
contracts are both quite common and quite controversial.18 They are
particularly common in contracts with transportation workers, such as
truckers.19 Moreover, misclassification of workers as independent
contractors is “pervasive” in the transportation sector.20 Business groups,
including the American Trucking Association and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, have exclaimed that the question of whether independent
contractors in the transportation sector are bound by the FAA is “an
exceptionally important issue,”21 and that it “will have far-reaching
impact”22 and “sweeping implications for the transportation industry.”23
Despite the high stakes involved and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
involvement, this issue has received scant attention from the academic
community. While scholars have addressed whether Section 1 should
cover all employment sectors rather than just transportation,24 and have
addressed whether mandatory arbitration tends to put workers at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis litigation,25 almost no academics or interest groups
have addressed whether the Act’s exemption for “contracts of
employment” should cover independent contractors.26
18 See, e.g., Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev.
531, 551–52 (2014) (describing arguments made in favor and against binding mandatory
arbitration).
19 See, e.g., Brief of Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 1, Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017) (No.
17-340) (stating that “many” trucking companies utilize mandatory arbitration provisions in their
contracts with truck drivers).
20 CARRÉ, supra note 8, at 11 (stating that industry deregulation and the heavy use of
purportedly “self-employed drivers” has resulted in a “pervasive misclassification in the trucking
industry in particular”); see also Brief of Am. Trucking Ass’ns, supra note 19, at 4 (stating that the
practice of treating truck drivers as independent “owner-operators” or independent contractors is
“widespread and economically crucial”).
21 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. in Support of DefendantAppellant’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 11, Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857
F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2364).
22 Brief of Am. Trucking Ass’ns, supra note 19, at 4.
23 Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 15, Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7
(1st Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2364).
24 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using
Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1312
(2015) (contending that “employees win less often and less money in arbitration”); Alexander J.S.
Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 71 (2014) (finding that employees fare worse in arbitration than in litigation); Lewis L.
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
29 (1998) (suggesting that employees may prevail more frequently in arbitration than in litigation).
26 Of course, that has changed slightly since the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue.
Several interest groups have submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Court and have published
arguments about why they think that Section 1’s exemption should or should not cover independent
contractors. See, e.g., Andrew Grossman & Ilya Shapiro, Original Meaning Should Decide
Arbitration Act Case on Independent Contractors, CATO INSTITUTE (May 21, 2018 4:06 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/original-meaning-should-decide-arbitration-act-case-independentcontractors, archived at https://perma.cc/DRD2-5YAE.
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In the courts, several district courts have assumed, without analysis,
that the phrase “contracts of employment” refers to contracts with
employees only, and thus that only employees (and not independent
contractors) are exempt from the FAA.27 By contrast, the First Circuit,
the only circuit court to yet address the issue, held that the term “contracts
of employment” encompasses both employees and independent
contractors and that both groups are exempt from the FAA.28
The First Circuit’s decision is the one that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review. Given that the First Circuit was the first
federal court of appeals to address this question, and that there is no
circuit split, the fact that Court took the case at all suggests that it is
skeptical of the First Circuit’s reasoning and is inclined to hold that the
Section 1 exemption applies only to employees and not to independent
contractors.
However, this Article argues that such an approach would be
misguided, both as a matter of doctrine and as a matter of policy. A close
examination of the meaning of the term “contract of employment,” at the
time that the FAA was enacted, along with the Act’s legislative history,
indicates that the exemption was intended to apply to all contracts for
work without regard to whether the worker in question satisfied the
common-law definition of an employee or an independent contractor.
Although it might be natural to initially assume that “contract of
employment” refers to contracts with employees, this Article explains
that interpreting that phrase to apply to all transportation workers, both
employees and independent contractors alike, is most faithful to the
statutory text, the legislative history, and the FAA’s purposes.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the history
of the FAA’s exemption for “contracts of employment” and discusses
how the Supreme Court limited that exemption to transportation workers.
Part II addresses the significance and implications of determining
whether the exemption covers all transportation workers or is limited to
employees. Part III examines why the clearest meaning of the Act’s text
is that the exemption covers all workers and is not limited to employees.
Part IV addresses why the legislative history and the historical context
surrounding labor disputes in the transportation industry also support
reading Section 1 to cover employees and independent contractors. Part
V explains why interpreting Section 1 to exempt all transportation
workers would be most faithful to the policies underlying the FAA, in
27 See, e.g., Carney v. JNJ Express, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 848, 852–53 (W.D. Tenn. 2014);
Villalpando v. Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., 17 F. Supp. 3d 969, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2014); OwnerOperator Independent Drivers, Inc. v. C.R. England, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (D. Utah
2004); Gagnon v. Serv. Trucking, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1363–65 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
28 Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017). In the interest of full disclosure, the
author notes that he filed an amicus curiae brief in that case, as well. Brief of Amicus Curiae
Professor Richard H. Frankel in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Dominic Oliviera, Oliveira v. New
Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2364).
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general, and Section 1, in particular, and would reduce the incentives for
transportation companies to misclassify employees as independent
contractors.
Misclassifying employees as independent contractors is a serious
problem with substantial economic consequences. While some
misclassification is accidental, much of it, unfortunately, is intentional.
Employers should not get the double benefit of mislabeling their
employees as independent contractors and then using that label to insulate
themselves from judicial accountability for their actions.
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT’S ENACTMENT AND THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION TO LIMIT SECTION 1 TO TRANSPORTATION WORKERS
The Federal Arbitration Act, relatively speaking, is an ancient
statute. It was enacted in 1925, before the New Deal and the rise of the
modern administrative state, before the advent of most federal labor and
civil rights laws, before the widespread growth in the use of nonnegotiable adhesion contracts,29 and before the Supreme Court decided
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins30 that federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.
Many scholars believe that the intended scope of the Act was quite
narrow: to allow sophisticated commercial merchants to have their
contractual disputes with other sophisticated commercial merchants
resolved by mutually-agreed upon experts in their field rather than by
federal judges.31
29 While the use of adhesion contracts was not as widespread as it is today, even at the time of
the Act’s adoption, some labor activists were concerned about the rise of adhesion contracts in the
employment arena. See infra notes 159, 160, and accompanying text.
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31 See, e.g., Christopher Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 269 (2015)
(“Congress was exclusively concerned with the enforceability of arbitration agreements between
sophisticated businesses in commercial disputes.”); id. at 302–07, (describing Congressional
hearings on the FAA); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 106
(2006) (“The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant arbitrations,
never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking The Supreme Court’s Preference for Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 647 (1996)
(“Most commentators have concluded that the FAA was envisioned as applying to consensual
transactions between two merchants of roughly equal bargaining power and not necessarily to
transactions between a large merchant and a much weaker and less knowledgeable consumer.”);
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33,75–81 (1997) (arguing
that the framers intended for the FAA to be limited to commercial disputes between business
entities). One of the drafters and major proponents of the Act, Julius Henry Cohen, testified before
Congress in hearings regarding the FAA that “the bar associations of the country” were aligned
with the community in supporting arbitration as a way “to make the disposition of business in the
commercial world less expensive . . . .” Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint
Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong.
13 (1924) [hereinafter “Joint Hearing”] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen); see also Gilmer v.
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In the early 1900s, merchants who used arbitration agreements with
other merchants became frustrated because federal courts were refusing
to enforce arbitration provisions through the remedy of specific
performance.32 Their refusal derived from two doctrines that the drafters
concluded reflected a hostility toward arbitration vis-à-vis courts. The
first was the “ouster” doctrine, under which federal courts refused to
enforce any provision that would “oust” them of jurisdiction and transfer
it to private arbitrators.33 The second was the “dual agency doctrine,”
which “maintained that an arbitrator was merely a dual agent of the
parties, and as such, either party could revoke his authority at any time.”34
As a result, arbitration clauses were essentially “revocable at will by
either party to the agreement.”35
In response, several members of the American Bar Association
devised and drafted the Federal Arbitration Act, which would make
certain arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court.36 They
submitted their bill to Congress and revised it over several years.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is little
dispute that the primary concern animating the FAA was the perceived need by the business
community to overturn the common-law rule that denied specific enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate in contracts between business entities.”). Although the Supreme Court has rejected this
view, Justice Ginsburg has emphasized the narrow scope of the FAA in several recent dissents. See,
e.g., Epic Systs. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642–43 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The
legislative hearings and debate leading up to the FAA’s passage evidence Congress’ aim to enable
merchants of roughly equal bargaining power to enter into binding agreements to arbitrate
commercial disputes.”) (emphasis in original); DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477–78
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that Congress was intending to allow for arbitration of
commercial disputes and that “Congress in 1925 could not have anticipated that the Court would
apply the FAA to render consumer adhesion contracts invulnerable to attack by parties who never
meaningfully agreed to arbitration in the first place”).
32 Frankel, supra note 18, at 538 (describing the courts’ treatment of arbitration clauses prior
to the enactment of the FAA).
33 Bernardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 210–11 & n.5 (1956); see also Schwartz,
supra note 31, at 74 (1997); Joint Hearing, supra note 31 (discussing the need for an arbitration
statute in order to overcome problems created by the ouster doctrine). The ouster doctrine was
criticized for being overly formalistic, reflecting an irrational judicial hostility to arbitration, and in
unduly interfering with the freedom of contract. See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982–84 (2d Cir. 1942); Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32,
296 N.W. 475, 477 (Minn. 1941) (“Arbitration simply removes a controversy from the arena of
litigation. It is no more an ouster of judicial jurisdiction than is compromise and settlement or that
peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity known as the covenant not to sue. Each disposes of issues
without litigation. One no more than the other ousts the courts of jurisdiction.”); Ezell v. Rocky
Mtn. Bean & Elevator Co., 232 P. 680 (Colo. 1925); see also Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance
of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 60–63
(1997) (describing some criticisms of the ouster doctrine).
34 Schwartz, supra note 31, at 74; Sternlight, supra note 31, at 645 n.32.
35 See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(noting that judicial “hostility [to arbitration agreements] was reflected in two different doctrines:
‘revocability,’ which allowed parties to repudiate arbitration agreements at any time before the
arbitrator’s award was made, and ‘invalidity’ or ‘unenforceability,’ equivalent rules that flatly
denied any remedy for the failure to honor an arbitration agreement”); Moses, supra note 31, at
101; Schwartz, supra note 31, at 74.
36 See, e.g., Moses, supra note 31, at 101–03; see generally SZALAI, supra note 15, Chs. 2–3.
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Congress held hearings on the Act in both 1923 and 1924. During those
hearings, the proponents of the Act who testified emphasized the benefits
of arbitration for business-to-business contract disputes and explained
that allowing those disputes to be arbitrated would reduce judicial
backlog and free up courts to deal with other types of legal questions.37
There was never any indication given at the hearing that the Act would
apply to labor and employment relationships.38
As others have argued, the legislative history of Section 1 suggests
that it was intended to exempt all workers from the Act, not just
transportation workers.39 The Act was originally introduced in Congress
in 1922, though it was not enacted until 1925.40 The original bill did not
have any provision relating to contracts of employment. In January, 1923,
the arbitration bill “drew the attention of Andrew Furuseth, President of
the International Seaman’s Union (ISU),” and a towering labor figure at
the time.41 He expressed opposition to the bill on the ground that it could
be used to force all workers, including his union members, into
arbitration.42 Based on his analysis, organized labor opposed the bill.
Around the same time, and shortly before the scheduled Senate
Hearing on the bill, Senator Thomas Sterling of South Dakota—an
important Senator on the arbitration bill—informed one of the ABA
drafters of the bill that a prominent railroad lawyer and one of his most
prominent constituents expressed several concerns about the bill,
including its applicability to labor agreements.43 The drafters decided that
“to leave out labor disputes and seamen” would be “simpler” and
proposed adding the following language to the bill: “But nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”44 Thus, it appears that the reason the amendment identified
37 See Leslie, supra note 31, at 302–06 (describing testimony); Moses, supra note 31, at 102–
05 (describing statements by Bernheimer and Cohen about how arbitration would reduce judicial
backlog and help commercial merchants resolve disputes).
38 See Moses, supra note 31, at 147 (“no one in 1925—not the drafters, the Secretary of
Commerce, organized labor, nor members of Congress—believed that the FAA applied to
employment contracts.”). Rather, the Congressional floor testimony on the bill reinforced that the
Act only applied to commercial contracts. See 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (Feb. 5, 1924) (statement of
Rep. Graham, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee) (“It creates no new legislation; grants no
new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty
contracts.”) (emphasis added); 65 Cong. Rec. 11080 (June 6, 1924) (“This bill provides that were
there are commercial contracts and there is disagreement under the contract, the court can force an
arbitration agreement in the same way as other portions of the contract.”) (emphasis added).
39 See SZALAI, supra note 15, at 191–92 (2013); Finkin, supra note 15. But see Kolakowsi,
supra note 15 (arguing that Section 1 should be limited to transportation workers).
40 Finkin, supra note 15, at 284.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 284–85, 287–89 (citing PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEAMAN’S UNION OF AMERICA (1923) (Appendix to Convention
Proceedings)); SZALAI, supra note 15, at 132.
43 SZALAI, supra note 15, at 133–35.
44 Id.
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“seamen” and “railroad employees” in addition to all other classes of
workers was because the two people who expressed concern about
subjecting labor to arbitration agreements came from the seamen’s union
and the railroad industry.
Less than a week after Senator Sterling submitted his letter, the
Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the bill on January 31,
1923. At the hearing, W.H.H. Piatt, the Chair of the American Bar
Association Committee testified that he was not aware of Sterling’s
constituent’s letter but that he did want to address Mr. Furuseth’s
concerns by proposing to eliminate all labor disputes from the bill:
Senator Sterling: Has your attention been called to the letter I received
from a constituent of mine, Mr. C.O. Bailey, a lawyer at Sioux Falls?
Mr. Piatt: No, sir; but there is another matter I should call to your
attention. Since you introduced this bill there has been an objection
raised against it that I think should be met here, to wit, the official
head, or whatever he is, of that part of the labor union that has to do
with the ocean—the seamen—
Senator Sterling: Mr. Furuseth?
Mr. Piatt: Yes; some such name as that. He has objected to it, and
criticized it on the ground that the bill in its present form would affect,
in fact compel, arbitration of the matters of agreement between the
stevedores and their employers. Now, it was not the intention of the
bill to have any such effect as that. It was not the intention of this bill
to make an industrial arbitration in any sense; and so I suggest that in
as far as the committee is concerned, if your honorable committee
should feel that there is any danger of that, they should add to the bill
the following language, “but nothing herein contained shall apply to
seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce.”
It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at
all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege
of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages
are, if they want to do it. Now, that is all there is in this.45

Notably, Mr. Piatt’s proposed language for the exemption refers to
“seamen”—likely in reference to Mr. Furuseth’s position as head of the
seaman’s union—and “any other class of workers,” thus suggesting a
broad reading applicable to all workers. It is also notable that Mr. Piatt’s
proposed language does not mention “contracts of employment” at all but
just says broadly that it will not apply to workers in interstate commerce.
Immediately following Mr. Piatt’s testimony on this specific point,
Senator Thomas Sterling submitted a letter from Secretary of Commerce
45 Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Senate Hearing] (statement of W.H.H.
Piatt, Representative, ABA).
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Herbert Hoover.46 In that letter, Secretary Hoover expressed his general
support for the bill, and also responded to the same labor opposition that
Mr. Piatt had, proposing the language that was ultimately added to
Section 1: “If objection appears to the inclusion of workers’ contracts in
the law’s scheme, it might well be amended by stating ‘but nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.’”47 This was the same language that the drafters proposed in
response to the concerns of Senator Sterling’s constituent. As Professor
Szalai explains, it appears that the letter may have been written by the
bill’s drafters, who then persuaded Hoover to sign it.48
While Secretary Hoover’s letter refers to “contracts of
employment,” there is no indication that he intended to create a different
exemption than that proposed by Mr. Piatt. Indeed, Hoover’s letter was
written by the other members of the ABA that were working with Piatt in
support of the bill. Both Mr. Piatt and Secretary Hoover were responding
to the same objection and addressed it in a similar way. Nor is there any
indication that Secretary Hoover was intending to usurp or supplant Mr.
Piatt and his committee, the very people who drafted the bill and brought
it to Congress. The language contained in Secretary Hoover’s letter was
added to Section 1. After that, organized labor dropped its opposition,
and the Act was adopted in 1925.49
Following the Act’s enactment, the question arose whether the
exemption applied to all workers or only those who were directly
“engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,” i.e. transportation workers.
Those arguing for a narrow reading point out that the Act refers
specifically to “seamen, railroad employees,” and “any other class of
worker engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.”50 Some have argued
that the specific references to transportation workers along with workers
“engaged” in commerce shows that the provision was limited to workers
who were directly involved in moving goods through interstate
commerce, i.e. transportation workers.51 However, while Section 1’s text
is perhaps more ambiguous than Mr. Piatt’s statements at the Senate
46
47

Id. at 14.
Id. The amendment received little, if any, discussion outside of these passages. When
hearings were next held in 1924, the current exemption was written into Section 1. Arbitration of
Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of
the Comms. of the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924). The issue received no further
discussion prior to the law’s enactment in 1925.
48 SZALAI, supra note 15, at 145.
49 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 127 & n.8 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing legislative history). Directly following Congress’s passage of the Act,
organized labor groups reinforced their understanding that Section 1 eliminated all labor
agreements from the FAA’s purview. See id. at n.8 (citing PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 52 (1925)).
50 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
51 See, e.g., Kolakowsi, supra note 15, at 2175–82.
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Hearing, the legislative history lends strong support to the argument that
the drafters intended to exempt all labor disputes from the Acts’ reach.
Additionally, it is important to remember that the FAA was enacted
in 1925, before the Supreme Court’s New Deal era expansion of the
Commerce Clause’s scope.52 At that time, the Supreme Court had
restricted the Commerce Clause’s ability to regulate workers to only
those workers directly engaged in the channels of commerce.53 Thus,
even if Congress believed that Section 1 would apply only to workers
directly engaged in the channels of commerce, this was because those
were the only workers Congress had the power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause at the time. In other words, Congress intended Section
1 to apply to every worker it had the power to regulate.54 Although one
might believe that Section 1 (and indeed the entire FAA) should only
extend to the workers Congress believed it could regulate under the
Commerce Clause in 1925, the Supreme Court has held that the FAA
should extend to the full reach of the Commerce Clause as it has expanded
over time.55 For consistency, the Section 1 exemption should similarly
expand to the full reach of the Commerce Clause as it has expanded over
time, and thus it should not be limited to employees directly engaged in
the channels of commerce, but extend to all workers.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held in 2001 that Section 1 should
be given “a narrow construction” and exempt only transportation workers
from the Act.56 The Court determined that the text was clear, relying on
Section 1’s reference to workers “engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce” and its listing of transportation workers, specifically “seamen
[and] railroad employees” as examples of workers covered by the
exemption.57 Because it found the text unambiguous, the Court refused
to consider the legislative history described above,58 and in any event
cautioned that the relevant legislative history came not from the members
52 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (noting that the New Deal era
Commerce Clause decisions “ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly
expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause”).
53 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 136 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting).
54 See, e.g., Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9–19, Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2000) (No. 99-1379) (describing the scope of the Commerce
Clause in 1925 and how the FAA exemption was intended to reach co-extensively with the
Commerce Clause’s reach). Several scholars have addressed this question in more detail. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
55 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268, 273-77 (1995) (holding that
the FAA should be interpreted broadly to apply to all matters within the scope of the Commerce
Clause, and that the FAA’s applicability should expand in line with the expansion of the scope of
the Commerce Clause).
56 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (“We now decide that the better
interpretation is to construe the statute, as most of the Courts of Appeals have done, to confine the
exemption to transportation workers.”).
57 Id. at 111–19.
58 Id. at 119 (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we need not
address the legislative history of the exclusion provision.”).
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of Congress who voted on the bill, but from third-party witnesses like the
ABA committee chair, Mr. Piatt.59
Finally, the Court identified possible policy reasons why Congress
might have limited the exemption to transportation workers. It noted that
Congress had already created grievance procedures for certain
transportation workers, including railroad workers and seamen, in order
to prevent labor disruptions that would restrict “the free flow of goods.”60
Given that those workers were already subject to a Congressionallydefined dispute resolution mechanism, the Court reasoned, Congress may
have chosen to exclude them from the FAA so that they weren’t subject
to overlapping or conflicting dispute resolution schemes.61
But the decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams addressed only
whether Section 1 covered all “contracts of employment” or only
“contracts of employment” with transportation workers. It did not
address, or purport to address, whether the exemption covered all
transportation workers, or whether it is limited only to employees. That
important question is what the Court is now poised to answer this term.
II.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
DISTINCTION

The conventional employer-employee relationship is losing its hold
on the American economy. With the growth of the gig economy,62 and as
more companies and individuals have the flexibility to design their own
working relationships, more work relationships are taking the form of an
independent contractor model rather than an employer-employee
model.63 The number of independent contractors “is expected to continue
to grow at a steady clip.”64 The use of independent contractors is
59
60
61

Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
Id. (“It is reasonable to assume that Congress excluded ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’
from the FAA for the simple reason that it did not wish to unsettle established or developing
statutory dispute resolution schemes covering specific workers.”).
62 “Gig economy” has been defined as one where “temporary, flexible jobs are commonplace
and companies tend toward hiring independent contractors and freelancers instead of full-time
employees. A gig economy undermines the traditional economy of full-time workers who rarely
change positions and instead focus on a lifetime career.” Gig Economy, INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gig-economy.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/MPK6-ZXZH.
63 One recent study found the number of independent contractors increased by 2.1 million
workers from 2010–2014, accounting for nearly thirty percent of all jobs added during that period.
See Will Rinehart & Ben Gitis, Independent Contractors and the Emerging Gig Economy,
AMERICAN ACTION FORUM (July 29, 2015), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/
independent-contractors-and-the-emerging-gig-economy, archived at https://perma.cc/BMF7A7CM.
64 Brendan Schrader, Here’s Why the Freelancer Economy is on the Rise, FAST COMPANY
(Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3049532/heres-why-the-freelancer-economy-ison-the-rise, archived at https://perma.cc/XWB4-53AM; see also Brief of the Chamber of
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particularly prevalent in the transportation sector, in which more than
thirteen million people work. Just as small-scale transportation like ridesharing services label their drivers as independent contractors,65 largescale transportation like long-haul and interstate trucking has also moved
toward labeling drivers as independent contractors rather than
employees.66
This is not surprising. Businesses have significant incentives to call
their workers independent contractors. A worker who is an independent
contractor rather than an employee does not receive the benefit of civil
rights and labor laws, many of which cover only “employees.” Similarly,
independent contractors, unlike employees, are not entitled to overtime
pay and minimum wage protections, unemployment compensation, and
family and medical leave.67 Employers are also not responsible for
payroll taxes for independent contractors, but they are for employees.68
A number of federal worker protection laws that were enacted well
after the FAA, including Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), expressly apply to
employees and have been interpreted to not apply to independent
contractors.69 The question whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor for purposes of these statutes is a question of law
that is based on several factors related to the level of control the employer
exerts over the worker.70

Commerce of the U.S. and the Society for Human Resource Management as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 2, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveria, No. 17-340 (U.S. May 21, 2018).
65 In fact, ride-sharing companies like Uber and Lyft provide another example of workers being
mislabeled by their employers as independent contractors. Earlier this year, the California Supreme
Court affirmed certification of a class of ride-sharing drivers and indicated that the drivers should
likely be treated as employees rather than as independent contractors under California law.
Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). The ruling leaves open whether
the drivers would be considered employees or independent contractors under federal law or under
other states’ laws.
66 Brief for Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, New Prime, Inc.
v. Oliveria, 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017) (No. 17-340) (stating that independent contractor agreements
are widespread throughout the trucking industry); Brief for Customized Logistics and Delivery
Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveria, 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.
2017) (No. 17-340) (stating that independent contractor agreements are common in the delivery
and logistics arenas).
67 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 6.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (noting that
ERISA does not apply to independent contractors); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,
256–57 (1968) (noting that the NLRA does not apply to independent contractors); Alberty-Velez
v. Corporacion de Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that
Title VII does not apply to independent contractors); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987–1 C.B. 296, 298–29
(exempting independent contractors from Title VII protections); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987–1 C.B. 296,
298–299 (exempting independent contractors from tax law).
70 A common test for determining if someone is an employee is that used by the Internal
Revenue Service, which applies a twenty-factor test. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987–1 C.B. 296, 298–
299; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 323–24 (discussing some of the factors relevant
to determining “employee” status under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)).
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Nonetheless, employers frequently treat their workers as
independent contractors, even when the workers satisfy the legal
definition of an employee. According to the United States Department of
Labor, “the misclassification of employees as independent contractors”
is “one of the most serious problems facing affected workers, employers
and the entire economy.”71 Some studies estimate that between 10% and
30% of employers misclassify workers and that millions of workers are
mislabeled as independent contractors.72 The federal government
estimates that misclassification likely deprives it of billions of dollars in
lost tax revenue.73 In the transportation section in particular,
misclassification of workers as independent contractors is “pervasive.”74
Perhaps not surprisingly, a regime of widespread misclassification
or purported misclassification of employees as independent contractors
results in widespread litigation, as workers bring wage-and-hour claims
and other lawsuits contending that they have been deprived of benefits
and legal protections by virtue of being mislabeled as independent
contractors rather than employees.75 Many of these claims are brought as
class actions or other forms of collective litigation,76 and thus whether
workers are subject to mandatory arbitration clauses is critically
important. This is particularly true for misclassification claims because
arbitration clauses often prohibit workers from proceeding in class
actions or collective litigation. The Supreme Court has held that bans on
class actions and collective litigation in employment contracts can be
enforced under the FAA, even where individual actions are prohibitively
expensive or otherwise infeasible and thus where enforcing the bans
effectively deprives workers of any meaningful ability to pursue their

71
72
73
74

See supra note 6.
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 8; CARRÉ, supra note 8, at 11.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9.
CARRÉ, supra note 8, at 11 (stating that there is “pervasive misclassification in the trucking
industry” in particular, resulting from industry deregulation and the heavy use of purportedly “selfemployed drivers”).
75 See, e.g., FREDRIC C. LEFFLER, MISCLASSIFYING WORKERS AS INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS, 1 (2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_
law/meetings/2011/ac2011/083.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Z2FF-68VE
(stating that “[l]awsuits alleging improper classification of workers as independent contractors are
on the rise” and that litigation in this area “will continue to grow”).
76 See, e.g., Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017) (addressing whether
trucking workers bringing a putative wage-and-hour class action were required to arbitrate their
dispute); In re Swift Trans. Co., Inc., 830 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (putative class
action of trucking workers alleging that they were wrongly classified as independent contractors);
see also LEFFLER, supra note 75, at 1 (stating that wrongful classification claims involve individual,
collective, and class actions). Even the Circuit City court noted that the amount in dispute in
individual employment cases is relatively small, which suggests that many employment claims
must be brought as class actions or not at all. 532 U.S. at 123 (“Arbitration agreements allow parties
to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment
litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial
contracts.”).
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claims.77 This gives transportation companies a vested interest in having
their workers classified as independent contractors. Not only does
misclassification mean that employers can give their workers fewer
protections, it also arguably allows them to require their workers to
arbitrate any disputes that arise—an opportunity that is meaningless
where the arbitration clause prohibits class actions or otherwise makes it
infeasible to utilize the arbitration process.
Businesses and other arbitration supporters tout that arbitration is a
faster, cheaper alternative to litigation, and that it helps consumers by
reducing litigation costs, a benefit that is passed on to customers in the
form of lower prices for goods and services.78 However, detractors of
arbitration have taken the position that businesses like arbitration because
it systematically disfavors consumers and employees relative to the
corporations that stand on the other side of the contract. Arbitration
opponents assert that many corporations draft arbitration clauses with
terms that are designed to favor them by barring plaintiffs from
proceeding in class actions, shortening statutes-of-limitations for filing
77 Arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts often prohibit class action claims
and require arbitration on an individual basis. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) 10 (Mar. 2015), https://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/7N4X-DAPU (finding that more than 85% of arbitration clauses
banned class actions in a study of six sectors of the consumer financial services market); Theodore
Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
871 (2008) (conducting survey and finding that virtually all business-consumer arbitration clauses
it studied prohibited class actions). Many have criticized class action bans as de facto immunity
provisions for companies because many claims brought as class actions involve small individual
damages claims or are sufficiently expensive to litigate, making them infeasible to bring on an
individual basis, either in court or in arbitration. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App.
4th 1094, 1101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (describing a class action ban as a “get out of jail free card”
for the defendant); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND.
L.J. 239, 242 (2012) (“Nothing is more claim-suppressing than a ban on class actions, particularly
in cases where the economics of disputing make pursuit of individual cases irrational.”). However,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly sanctioned the use of class action bans, including in labor
contracts, regardless of whether the underlying claims could not be brought on an individual basis.
See Epic Sys., Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (finding that collective action bans did not
violate the National Labor Relations Act); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,
236–39 (2013) (finding that an arbitration clause prohibiting collective action could be enforced
even if it prevented the plaintiffs from pursuing their federal statutory claims); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–52 (2011) (striking down state law that prohibited the use
of class action bans as preempted by the FAA).
78 See, e.g., Dwight Golann, Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43 BUS.
LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988) (“The primary advantage for consumers in binding arbitration is that it
offers at least the possibility of a faster and cheaper decisionmaking mechanism for their
complaints.”); The “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007”: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 95, 105–
06 (2007) (prepared statement of Peter B. Rutledge) 13 (arguing that eliminating mandatory
arbitration would “increase the costs of dispute resolution, and a portion of these costs would be
passed onto employees (in the form of lower wages), consumers (in the form of higher prices) and
investors (in the form of lower share prices).”).
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suits, requiring the parties to keep the arbitration proceedings secret, and
limiting the ability of parties to seek discovery or obtain necessary
evidence to support their claims.79 They also argue that arbitration creates
a “repeat player bias” whereby arbitrators are inclined to support the
repeat player—most often the corporations—out of fear that they will not
be chosen by the corporations for future cases if they rule against the
corporations.80 Though the evidence regarding repeat-player bias so far
appears inconclusive,81 there is evidence that when workers are required
to bring claims in arbitration they fare worse than they do in court.82
Finally, detractors point out that arbitrators act in secret, that arbitrators
are not bound to apply the law in the way that judges are, and that the
FAA provides for only extremely limited judicial review of an arbitrator’s
decision.83 Thus, it is hardly surprising that in recent years, transportation
companies have become frequent users of mandatory arbitration clauses
in their contracts with workers.84
As workers have brought misclassification claims, businesses have
frequently moved to compel arbitration under the FAA. That, in turn, has
raised the question as to whether the FAA’s exemption for transportation
workers applies to all workers including independent contractors, or
whether the exemption is limited to those workers who meet the
traditional legal definition of an employee. Most district courts have
reflexively assumed, without analysis, that the exemption for “contracts
of employment” applies only to employer-employee relationships and
79 See, e.g., F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS, 4–14 (NCLC 6th ed. 2011) (canvassing the various
criticisms of binding mandatory arbitration).
80 See e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); BLAND
ET AL., supra note 79, 5–6 (“There is some empirical evidence and a good deal of commentary to
suggest that arbitrators do, in fact, have a tendency to favor ‘repeat player’ clients.”).
81 See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INS., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION PRELIMINARY REPORT 1, 3–16 (Mar. 2009), https://www.adr.org/
sites/default/files/document_repository/Searle%20Civil%20Justice%20Institute%20Report%
20on%20Consumer%20Arbitration.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/UNU4-TFRW (describing no
statistically significant repeat-player effect in its analysis of American Arbitration Association data
and ascribing any repeat-player effect to better case screening by repeat-players than to arbitrator
bias).
82 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
83 Section 10 of the FAA provides the grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s award. Those
grounds are mostly limited to whether the award resulted from corruption or fraud, or if the
arbitrators grossly exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
grounds for vacating an award extremely narrowly. See, e.g. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n
v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
84 See e.g., Brief of Am. Trucking Ass’ns, supra note 19, at 1 (stating that “many” trucking
companies utilize mandatory arbitration provisions in their contracts with truck drivers); Brief of
Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., supra note 21, at 12 (asserting that
“numerous businesses have indeed relied on the FAA in including arbitration provisions in their
agreements with independent contractors”); Brief for Customized Logistics and Delivery Ass’n,
supra note 66, at 1–2 (asserting that delivery logistics companies “frequently rely on arbitration
provisions” in their contracts with independent contractors).
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excludes independent contractors.85
Last year, the First Circuit became the first federal court of appeals
to address this issue. It concluded, based on an analysis of how the phrase
“contracts of employment” was used around the time the FAA was
enacted in 1925, that the phrase referred to all contracts for work, not just
to contracts with employees.86 The First Circuit then held that all
transportation workers, employees and independent contractors alike, are
exempt from the FAA under Section 1.87
Recognizing the significance of the First Circuit’s ruling and its
potential effect on the transportation industry, the defendant trucking
company, New Prime, Inc., enlisted the help of several business groups
and sought en banc review, claiming that the decision “will have farreaching impact”88 with “sweeping implications for the transportation
industry.”89 After the First Circuit declined to rehear the case, the
company, again with the help of numerous business groups as Amici
Curiae, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the First Circuit’s decision.90 On February 26, 2018, the Court
granted the petition and scheduled the case for its 2018–19 term.91
That the Court agreed to hear the case is striking and suggests that it
is inclined to reverse the First Circuit and hold that Section 1’s exemption
is limited to contracts with workers who meet the legal definition of an
employee. The First Circuit was the first court of appeals to rule on
whether Section 1’s exemption applies to independent contractors, and
no other circuit court had weighed-in when the Supreme Court granted
cert.92 Because the First Circuit was the only circuit to rule on the issue,
85 See, e.g., Carney v. JNJ Express, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 848, 852–53 (W.D. Tenn. 2014);
Villalpando v. Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., 17 F. Supp. 3d 969, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Port Drivers
Fed’n 18, Inc. v. All Saints, 757 F. Supp. 2d 463, 472 (D.N.J. 2011); Owner-Operator Indep.
Drivers, Inc. v. C.R. England, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (D. Utah 2004); Gagnon v. Serv.
Trucking, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1363-65 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Performance Team Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Aleman, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 536–37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); Johnson v. Noble, 608 N.E.2d
537, 540 (Ill. App. 1992); see also Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 17–18 & n.16 (1st Cir.
2017) (citing prior cases and stating that most prior decisions “simply assume, explicitly or
implicitly, that independent-contractor agreements are not contracts of employment under § 1” of
the FAA).
86 Oliveira, 857 F.3d at 20–22.
87 Id.
88 Brief of Am. Trucking Ass’ns, supra note 19, at 4.
89 Petition for Appellant for Rehearing En Banc at 15, Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7
(1st Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2364).
90 See Docket Sheet, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, No. 17-340 (U.S.), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-340.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/MY4T-VAFH (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
91 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018) (granting certiorari). Oral argument in the case is scheduled for
October 3, 2018. See Docket Sheet, supra note 90.
92 The issue of Section 1’s applicability to independent contractors in the transportation
industry also has come up indirectly before the Ninth Circuit, but the Court did not address or
decide the question because of the unusual procedural posture of the case. See In re Swift Transp.
Co, Inc., 830 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2016). There, like in Oliveira, a class of truck drivers (many of
whom were subject to arbitration clauses) asserted that they were wrongly classified as independent
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there was no circuit split on whether Section 1’s exemption is limited to
common-law employees.93 The Court normally prefers to take cases
where it can resolve a split among the circuits and establish a uniform
rule.94 Absent a split, it is less common for the Court to take a case
without giving more circuits a chance to weigh in, unless the case is of
unusually exceptional importance. If the Court approved of the First
Circuit’s decision, one would ordinarily expect it to deny cert and allow
the First Circuit’s decision to stand.
It may be that the Court is inclined to believe that the phrase
“contracts of employment” refers only to employer-employee
relationships and therefore excludes independent contractors. While that
might seem natural at first blush, it would be a mistake for the Court to
determine that just because the statute uses the term “employment” the
exemption is limited to employees and excludes independent contractors.
Rather, as explained below, as a matter of both statutory interpretation
and sensible policy, the term “contracts of employment” should be
understood as meaning “contracts for work,” and thus should encompass
all transportation workers, not just common-law employees.
III.

THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE “CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT”

The term “contracts of employment” should be understood to cover

contractors, and the district court ordered discovery on their status as employees or independent
contractors as a predicate for determining whether they were exempt from the FAA. Id. at 915. The
trucking company filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit seeking to block
discovery and an order requiring the district court to decide Section 1’s applicability without
examining extrinsic evidence, which the Ninth Circuit denied on the relatively narrow ground that
the high standard for issuing a writ of mandamus had not been satisfied. Id. at 915–17. The court
did not address whether independent contractors fell within the scope of the FAA’s exemption. In
dissent, Judge Ikuta argued that the court should not have ordered discovery and that whether a
“contract of employment” exists should be determined based on the contract alone—i.e. whether
or not the contract labels the worker an independent contractor. Id. at 919–20 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
That latter question of how a court determines whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor for purposes of the FAA could confront the Supreme Court if it decides that Section 1’s
exemption is limited to employees only.
93 The First Circuit’s decision arguably created a split with the Eighth Circuit on a subsidiary
question of whether the arbitrator or the court should decide whether the dispute falls within Section
1’s exemption. Compare Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 12–15 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding
that the court must decide) with Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the parties can delegate the question to an arbitrator). That question was also raised
in New Prime’s cert petition, and it is possible that the Court could decide that an arbitrator must
determine the scope of Section 1’s exemption and avoid reaching the merits. Whether a court or an
arbitrator is the proper tribunal to decide whether Section 1 is limited to common-law employees
is beyond the scope of this paper.
94 See, e.g., Kevin Russell, Commentary: Writing a Convincing Cert. Petition When There is
No Direct Circuit Split, SCOTUSBLOG (May 17, 2007), 11:50 AM), http:// www.scotusblog.com/
2007/05/commentary-writing-a-convincing-cert-petition-when-there-is-no-direct-circuit-split,
archived at https://perma.cc/M5JF-TAP4 (stating that the presence of a circuit split is “the Supreme
Court’s most important criteria for granting certiorari”).
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all transportation workers, including independent contractors. This is true
for two reasons. First, the term “employment” and the phrase “contract
of employment,” as they were used around the time the FAA was enacted
in 1925, were broader than the term “employee.” The terms referred to
all manner of work. Second, this conclusion is reinforced by looking at
the latter part of the exemption, referring to “seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”95 At the time of the FAA’s enactment, whether someone
qualified as a seaman or a railroad employee was determined by the type
of work they performed, not by whether they were employees or
contractors. Whether someone was a seaman or a railroad employee was
determined by federal law specific to that area, either by admiralty
principles or specific rules pertaining to railroads. Because neither type
of work was typically governed by common law rules, the fact that those
examples were included in the exemption suggests that Congress did not
intend Section 1’s exemption to be governed by common law principles
distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.
A.

“Contract of Employment” as “Contract for Work”

Unless otherwise defined, a statutory term should be given its
ordinary, common meaning as of the time of enactment.96 Additionally,
the meaning of a statutory term is not determined by reading the term in
isolation, but “is determined by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole.”97
Although the historical record is not free of ambiguity, and while
many members of Congress may not have been thinking about the
meaning and scope of the phrase “contracts of employment” when voting
on the FAA, I believe that the better argument is that at the time the FAA
was enacted, the term “employment” and the phrase “contracts of
employment” most likely referred to all contracts for work, not just work
by those who meet the legal definition of employee. The reasons for this
conclusion are fleshed out below.
1.

The Exemption’s Focus on the Type of Work a Person Performs
Rather Than That Person’s Legal Status
I am not arguing that in 1925 the law never made any distinctions

95
96

9 U.S.C. § 1.
See, e.g. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42–43 (1979) (looking at “the ordinary
meaning of the term ‘bribery’ at the time Congress enacted [the Travel Act] in 1961”).
97 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
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between employees and independent contractors. Such a distinction
existed at the time, and dates back earlier than the Nineteenth Century.
But it originally arose not for purposes of regulating labor relationships,
but as an agency principle for determining the scope of the master-servant
relationship.98 Under principles of agency law, masters were liable for
torts committed by their servants within the scope of their employment.
If the servant was considered a contractor, then the master was not
vicariously liable for the worker’s misconduct. If the worker was an
employee, then vicarious liability attached. In other words, this doctrine
governed how to apportion liability for torts committed by workers. It did
not pertain to defining the rights that workers had to collect wages or
obtain other protections in the course of their work.
As the Nineteenth Century progressed and the nature of labor
changed following the industrial revolution, states began to protect
workers through statute, rather than through the common-law doctrine of
master-servant agency law.99 When states began adopting workerprotective statutes in the wake of the industrial revolution, they employed
a variety of different terms with different meanings and scope. These
statutes did not singularly focus on employees versus independent
contractors. Statutes used terms like “workman,” “laborer,” “wage
earner,” “operative,” or “hireling.”100 These terms were not necessarily
synonymous with “employee” and may have had a broader or narrower
reach.
Just because a statute sought to protect employees does not mean
that it excluded independent contractors. In particular, laws that covered
a specific industry or category of employees often applied to all workers
in that area. With respect to those statutes, “[i]f the worker did a particular
type of work or worked in a particular industry, then he enjoyed the
benefit of the law’s protection without regard to the extent of the
employer’s control over the performance of the work,” which is one of
the critical factors for determining whether a person is an employee or a
contractor.101
Although the Supreme Court did not have many occasions to address
state worker-protection statutes prior to 1925, its 1889 decision in Vane
v. Newcombe is instructive in showing how statutes that covered
98 See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 302–06 (2001) (discussing
how “the ‘master-servant’ relationship” was “widely regarded as the pre-industrial precursor of the
‘employer-employee’ relationship” and explaining its role in determining an employer’s vicarious
liability for a worker’s negligence”); Micah Prieb Stolzfus Jost, Note, Independent Contractors,
Employees and Entrepreneurialism Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker
Approach, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2011) (stating that in the Nineteenth Century,
the employee-independent contractor question “was largely confined to the realm of tort law and
the question of a master’s vicarious liability for the conduct of a servant”).
99 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 98, at 306–10.
100 See id.
101 Id. at 308.
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particular classes of workers included contractors, and also how the terms
“employment” or “employed” might have had a broader meaning than
the term “employee.”102 In Vane, the Court compared an Indiana statute
giving a lien against any corporation “to its employees, for all work and
labor done and performed by them for the corporation,” with an Indiana
statute giving a lien on coal mines and mining machinery to “the miners
and other persons employed and working in and about the mines.”103 The
Court found that the former statute, which covered “employees” doing
any work for a corporation, without identifying any particular type of
work, excluded independent contractors.104 It found that under the latter
statute, which was specific to mining, the mine owners would be
obligated not just to their own employees, but to anyone “employed by
contractors doing work under contract for the owners of the mine.”105
The case supports the principle that during this period of time,
statutes written to protect specific classes of workers were understood to
protect anyone working in that area, regardless of their status. Given that
Section 1 specifically identifies types of workers, including seamen,
railroad employees, and workers “engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce,” and that the Supreme Court has found that those references
show that Congress was specifically trying to exempt the particular work
areas associated with transportation, Section 1 should be read to apply to
all transportation workers, regardless of whether they are classified as
employees or independent contractors.
Another textual clue supporting this reading is that Section 1’s
residual clause exempts “any other class of workers” engaged in the
channels of commerce, not “any other class of employees.” The use of
the term “worker” rather than “employee” reinforces that Congress was
focused on the type of work being performed rather than on the status of
the worker. It suggests that Congress intended to exempt anyone working
in the transportation sector, not that Congress was focused on whether or
not that worker was a contractor.
The natural counter-argument to this inference is that the exemption
also refers to “railroad employees” (rather than, say, “railroad workers”),
which arguably indicates that Congress wanted to limit the exemption to
workers who qualify as employees. However, I believe that is the less
persuasive reading. First, even if accepted, at most that makes the second
102
103
104
105

132 U.S. 220, 233–36 (1889).
Id. at 233–35.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235; see also id. at 236 (citing Munger v. Lenroot, 32 Wis. 541 (1873), in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that wage statutes for logging workers covered those employed by
the logging company and those hired by contractors). Although the case was decided more than 35
years before the FAA’s enactment, it is possible that Congress was aware of the decision, or the
principles emanating from the decision, when debating the FAA. See Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010) (“We normally assume that, when Congress enacts statutes, it
is aware of relevant judicial precedent.”).
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part of the clause ambiguous, as there is one reference to “employees”
and another reference to “workers.” Second, examining the exemption as
a whole supports the view that the exemption applies to all transportation
workers. A statutory term is known “by the company it keeps.”106 Here,
the terms immediately preceding and immediately following “railroad
employees” are not limited to employees. Whether workers qualify as
“seamen,” (the term preceding “railroad employees”), is determined by
the type of work they do rather than by how they were hired to do it.107
And the term “any other class of workers” similarly signifies a broader
reach than just employees. Indeed, in the period preceding the adoption
of the FAA, courts addressing worker protection statutes that used the
term “employee” alongside other categories of workers defined the term
“employee” by reference to those other categories covered by the
statute.108 The phrase “railroad employees” should be understood in that
context.
2.

The Meaning of the Phrase “Contracts of Employment”

It might seem natural to think of the phrase “contracts of
employment” as referring to employees only. But as the First Circuit
persuasively explained, at the time of the FAA’s enactment, “the phrase
‘contracts of employment’ contained in § 1 means simply ‘agreements to
do work.’”109 Crucially, the Act exempts “contracts of employment,” not
“contracts with employees.” Whether or not the term “employee” is a
legal term of art referring to those workers fitting within certain legallydefined parameters, the term “employment” is more general and is more
ordinarily understood as referring to all kinds of work. Indeed, there is
ample historical evidence indicating that prior to 1925, the terms
“employment” and “contracts of employment” encompassed all workers,
including independent contractors.110 For example, contemporaneous
legal sources defined an “independent contractor” as someone who
engaged in “independent employment.”111 Similarly, numerous
contemporary sources use the term “contracts of employment” as
106
107
108

Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
See infra Part IV.B.
See, e.g., In re New York Locomotive Works, 26 N.Y.S. 209, 211–13 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1893) (finding that in a statute covering “employees, operatives, and laborers” the meaning of
“employee” was determined in part by the term “laborer,” and therefore did not cover salaried
managers and administrators).
109 Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 20 (1st Cir. 2017).
110 Much of the historical research cited in this subsection was originally conducted by Jennifer
Bennett, of the law firm Public Justice, P.C., who is counsel for the Respondent Dominic Oliveira
in the case now before the Supreme Court, and is cited here with her permission.
111 See, e.g., Kreipke v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 32 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1929) (citing
treatise and case law); Pierson v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 170 F. 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1909) (citing
both a treatise and cases).
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encompassing contracts with independent contractors.112 Other cases
from the period refer to independent contractors as being “employed” or
having an “employer.”113 Finally, dictionaries from that period support
112 See, e.g., Annotation, Teamster as Independent Contractor Under Workmen’s Compensation
Acts, 42 A.L.R. 607, 617 (1926) (“When the contract of employment is such that the teamster is
bound to discharge the work himself, the employment is usually one of service, whereas, if, under
the contract, the teamster is not obligated to discharge the work personally, but may employ others
to that end and respond to the employer only for the faithful performance of the contract, the
employment is generally an independent one.”); THEOPHILUS J. MOLL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS & EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY 47–48 (1910) (“It has been laid down
that the relation of master and servant will not be inferred in a case where it appears that the power
of discharge was not an incident of the contract of employment.”); id. at 334 (“[The independent
contractor] . . . is especially liable for his own acts when he assumes this liability in his contract of
employment.”); Tankersley v. Webster, 243 P. 745, 747 (Okla. 1925) (“[T]he contract of
employment . . . conclusively shows that Casey was an independent contractor.”); Lindsay v.
McCaslin, 122 A. 412, 413 (Me. 1923) (“When the contract of employment has been reduced to
writing, the question whether the person employed was an independent contractor or merely a
servant is determined by the court as a matter of law.”); Waldron v. Garland Pocahontas Coal Co.,
109 S.E. 729, 729 (W. Va. 1921) (“Whether a person performing work for another is an independent
contractor depends upon a consideration of the contract of employment, the nature of the business,
the circumstances under which the contract was made and the work was done.”); U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. of Balt., Md. v. Lowry, 231 S.W. 818, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (explaining that whether a
person is an independent contractor or employee depends upon whether the “contract of
employment” gives the employer the right “to control the manner and continuance of the particular
service and the final result”); Luckie v. Diamond Coal Co., 183 P. 178, 182 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1919) (explaining that a person working under a “written contract of employment” could be either
“an independent contractor or [a] servant,” depending on how the work was actually performed);
Hamill v. Territilli, 195 Ill. App. 174, 176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1915) (“Appellant strongly contends that
under the contract of employment Territilli and Scully were independent contractors for whose
negligence it was not responsible, while appellee urges the contrary.”). Many of these sources were
also cited by the First Circuit in Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc. 857 F.3d at 20–21, n.20. It is also
interesting that courts, including the Supreme Court, used the term “contract of employment” to
refer to contracts with attorneys. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 575 (1923); Calhoun
v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 179 (1920) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42,
44 (1884). While attorneys may be “employed” by their clients, they are not likely to qualify as
“employees” of their clients.
113 See, e.g., Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922) (“[T]he Court of Common
Pleas held that the party employed was an independent contractor.”); Arthur v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co.,
204 U.S. 505, 516–17 (1907) (referring to “an independent contractor” as “employed . . . to do
work upon the freight”); John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Hewitt, 287 F. 120, 121 (4th Cir. 1923)
(“[W]hen a person contracts with another to do work not in itself a nuisance per se nor unlawful,
or attended with danger to others, and not subject to the employer’s control or direction, except as
to the results to be obtained, the employer is not answerable to a third person for injuries resulting
from the negligence of the contractor.”); Woodward Iron Co. v. Limbaugh, 276 F. 1, 2 (5th Cir.
1921) (“[T]the moving of the coal by tramcars was not included in the work which Waters was
employed to do as an independent contractor . . . .”); James Griffith & Sons Co. v. Brooks, 197 F.
723, 725 (6th Cir. 1912) (“For this purpose the company . . . employed him as an independent
contractor.”); Pierson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 170 F. 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1909) (“An
independent contractor is one who renders service in the course of an occupation representing the
will of his employer only as to the result of his work and not as to the means by which it is
accomplished.”); The Indrani, 101 F. 596, 598 (4th Cir. 1900) (“If an independent contractor is
employed to do a lawful act, and in the course of the work does some casual act of negligence, the
common employer is not answerable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Toledo Brewing &
Malting Co. v. Bosch, 101 F. 530, 531 (6th Cir. 1900) (“[T]his right was denied upon the ground
that the acts complained of as negligent were those of an independent contractor, for which the
defendant, as employer, was not responsible.”).

2018] T H E FA A A N D I N D E PEN D E N T C O N T R A C T O RS 125
the reading that “contracts of employment” would encompass all
workers, not just people who meet the legal definition of employee.114
At the same time, there are many contemporaneous cases and
references to employees and independent contractors indicating that they
occupy separate legal categories. In fact, New Prime focuses its Supreme
Court briefing almost exclusively on arguing that, by 1925, the law
clearly distinguished an “employee” from an “independent contractor.”115
But that seems beside the point. The FAA does not refer to “contracts
with employees” or use the words “employee” or “independent
contractor” anywhere. Even if the word “employee” was a term of art that
had a specialized legal meaning at the time, it does not appear that the
same was true for terms like “employment,” “employed,” or “employer,”
which were used more broadly to refer to a variety of work arrangements.
For example, even sources that distinguish employee from independent
contractor also define an independent contractor as someone who is not
controlled by “his employer.”116 Similarly, while an employee was
considered to be equivalent to a servant in the old master-servant
relationship, and thus distinct from an independent contractor, an
independent contractor was someone who undertook “independent
employment.”117 In short, the fact that the law may have distinguished
between employees and independent contractors has little bearing on the
meaning of the term “employment,” which appears to have encompassed
work relationships with independent contractors.118
114 See WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 488 (W.T.
Harris & F. Sturges Allen eds., 1923) (defining “contract” when used as a noun as “[a]n agreement
between two or more persons to do or forbear something”); id. at 718 (defining “employment” as
“[a]ct of employing, or state of being employed” and listing “work” as a synonym for
“employment”); id. (defining “employ” as “[t]o make use of the services of; to have or keep at
work; to give employment to”); see also WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 329 (3d ed. 1925)
(providing similar definition of “employment” and similarly listing “work” as a synonym for
“employment”); id. (defining “employ” as “[t]o make use of; use” and “[t]o give employment or
work to” and explaining “[e]mploy is specifically used to emphasize the idea of service to be
rendered”).
115 Brief for Petitioner at 16–24, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018) (No. 17340) (2018 WL 2278112).
116 See id. at 17 (“Strictly and etymologically, [employee] means ‘a person employed,’ but in
practice . . . and as generally used with us, though perhaps not confined to any official employment,
it is understood to mean some permanent employment or position.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting
BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 1533 (8th ed. 1914)).
117 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 115, at 22. (citing Carlson, supra note 98, at 309–10).
118 As one of Petitioner’s Amici, the CATO Institute noted that many states, in their early
workers’ compensation statutes from the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century, did appear
to use the term “employer” in a more specialized way than to refer to someone who hires
employees. Brief for the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9–13, New
Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018) (No. 17-340). Those statutes imposed one set of
remedial schemes for employees, and another set for independent contractors. Id. While these
statutes might provide some support for giving a narrower reading to the term “employer,” at least
within the context of those specific statutes, they do not compel a different reading of FAA Section
1. First, at most, that argument pertains to the meaning of the term “employer,” not the term
“employment,” which is the word the FAA uses. Second, it is important to note that these early
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Finally, if “contract of employment” was meant to cover only
employees, then the reference to “railroad employees” between “seamen”
and “other workers” would be redundant. There would be no need to limit
the exemption’s reach to railroad “employees” if the term “employment”
already limited the class of excluded workers to employees only. Given
that “[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant,” this further supports the conclusion that the term
“contracts of employment”119 covered all transportation workers, without
regard to their technical legal status as an employee or a contractor.120
IV. THE EXEMPTION’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ALSO SUPPORTS
INTERPRETING THE EXEMPTION TO COVER ALL TRANSPORTATION
WORKERS, NOT JUST EMPLOYEES
The FAA’s legislative history provides additional support for
interpreting Section 1’s exemption to cover all workers. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has often given short-shrift to the Act’s history in a
variety of ways, as other scholars have pointed out,121 including in its only
previous decision interpreting Section 1. Despite legislative history
indicating that Section 1 was intended to exclude all contracts of
employment, not just those with transportation workers, the Court refused

statutes provided a compensation framework for both employees and contractors. In other words,
the legislatures adopting these statutes considered both employees and independent contractors as
workers deserving of protection. This supports the position that both employees and contractors
were engaged in some form of employment to warrant similar protections. By contrast, most worker
compensation statutes today do not protect independent contractors. See, e.g., AN OVERVIEW OF
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR REGULATORY APPROACHES, NAT’L
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 2–3 (Mar. 17, 2009), www.naic.org/store/free/OWC-OP.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/38MY-TNYS (explaining that in most jurisdictions, independent contractors are
not eligible for workers’ compensation). Third, several of those statutes impose responsibility for
contractors’ injuries on the “primary employer” (i.e. the person who directly hires the contractors),
which directly undercuts any argument that the term “employer” excludes people who hire
independent contractors.
119 Hobbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)).
120 In recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a presumption that “when Congress has used
the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992). However, that modern
presumption concerning statutes enacted recently bears little on what presumptions the 1925
Congress was operating under when adopting the FAA. Additionally, even if one thought that
presumption should apply, the evidence that the common understanding of the meaning of “contract
of employment” at the time should be sufficient to rebut the presumption.
121 See, e.g., SZALAI, supra note 15, at 191–98 (discussing ways in which the Supreme Court
has misinterpreted the FAA by ignoring legislative history, and specifically asserting that the Court
has misinterpreted Section 1 of the Act); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 75–78; Frankel, supra note
18, at 537–54 (describing how the Court has created a federal policy favoring arbitration that is
inconsistent with Congress’s legislative intent).
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to consider the legislative history on the ground that the statutory
language was purportedly unambiguous and noting that the legislative
history was “problematic” and “speculat[ive].”122 The Court did,
however, invoke its own history-based rationale for limiting the
exemption to transportation workers, although not one that derives from
the Act’s legislative history. The Court explained that at the time the FAA
was passed, Congress had already enacted separate legislation creating
dispute resolution structures for seamen and railroad workers.123
Regarding seamen, Congress had passed the Shipping Commissioners
Act of 1872.124 Regarding railroad workers, Congress had passed the
Transportation Act of 1920125 and then the Railway Labor Act in 1926,
one year after the FAA.126 The Court surmised that it would be
“reasonable to assume” that Congress excluded seamen and railroad
workers because “it did not wish to unsettle established or developing
statutory dispute resolution schemes covering [those] specific
workers.”127 In other words, according to the Court, Congress had
decided that anyone who was subject to railroad or seamen dispute
resolution schemes should not also be subject to the FAA.128 And under
the statutory construction canon of ejusdem generis, which states that a
general term in a list should be interpreted similarly to the more specific
terms that precede it,129 Congress intended that similarly-placed “workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” would also be excluded.130
Given the Court’s prior disdain for the Act’s legislative history, it
would be no surprise if the Court again ignores it here. In my view, that
would be unfortunate, because the legislative history is illuminating in at
least two ways. First, the legislative history surrounding Section 1’s
exemption indicates that the drafters appeared to see no distinction
between “contracts of employments” and contracts affecting all workers.
Second, even taking at face value the Court’s conclusion that Congress
excluded seamen and railroad employees because it did not want to
subject them to overlapping schemes under both the FAA and the more
specific laws Congress had already enacted,131 that reasoning supports

122 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119–20 (2001) (stating that because the
text was clear, “we need not assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision”).
123 Id. at 120–21.
124 Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, 17 Stat. 262.
125 Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456.
126 Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151–165 (2012)); Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012)).
127 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1625 (2018) (defining the canon); 2A
N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (7th ed. Supp.
2017).
130 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 See supra notes 123–128 and accompanying text.
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the conclusion that Section 1’s exemption is not limited to employees.
That is because the dispute resolution schemes Congress created for those
industries did not turn on the common law notions of employee or masterservant liability to determine eligibility. Instead, the determination of
whether an individual was a seaman or a railroad employee was based on
the kind of work they did rather than on who hired them or the degree of
control they exercised. This supports the conclusion that Section 1’s
exemption should turn on the kind of work a person does (i.e.
transportation work) and not the person’s status as an employee or an
independent contractor.
A.

The Legislative History of Section 1 Supports Exempting All
Transportation Workers

The exemption’s legislative history suggests that the drafters of the
Act thought of “contracts of employment” as interchangeable with
contracts affecting workers. As discussed in Section III, about the
legislative history of the FAA, the Act was drafted primarily by several
members of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Commerce,
Trade, and Commercial Law.132 In particular, the two main drafters were
Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer, while William H.H. Piatt served
as chair of the ABA committee and worked closely with Bernheimer and
Cohen to support the bill.133 When Chairman Piatt testified on the bill to
the U.S. Senate, he did not propose to use the term “contracts of
employment” at all.134 Rather, he proposed that the Act simply exempt
workers and suggested the following language: “but nothing herein
contained shall apply to seamen or any class of workers in interstate and
foreign commerce.”135 He further elaborated that his language was meant
to show that the Act would not address “labor disputes” at all.136
At the same time, Cohen and Bernheimer, with whom Piatt was
working closely, were addressing concerns by an influential constituent
to a Senator whose support was important, and also lobbying Commerce
Secretary Herbert Hoover to write a letter to support the bill.137 They
suggested making the same changes to the bill that Piatt suggested in his
testimony, but using slightly different language—the language that
ultimately ended up as the text of Section 1’s exemption. When an
influential constituent of South Dakota Senator Thomas Sterling wrote to
Sterling prior to the 1923 Senate hearing to express various concerns
132 See generally SZALAI, supra note 15, ch. 4 (describing the history of the efforts to enact a
federal arbitration law); Moses, supra note 31, at 101–10, 127 n.186.
133 See SZALAI, supra note 15, at 103, 107, 109, 118–20; Moses, supra note 31, at 101–10.
134 See generally 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 45.
135 See id. at 9.
136 See id.
137 SZALAI, supra note 15, at 145.
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about the bill, including its applicability to railroad workers, Cohen
responded by suggesting the following language: “[b]ut nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”138 There is no indication that Cohen intended anything
substantively different than Piatt. In fact, “Cohen and Piatt likely
communicated with each other in advance of the [Senate] hearing and
discussed adding this language to the bill to address this labor
concern.”139
At the same time, right before the Senate hearing, Bernheimer
prevailed on Secretary Hoover to submit a letter (which may actually
have been drafted in part by Bernheimer) in support of the bill.140 In
expressing his support for the bill, Hoover suggested “virtually the same
language” for Section 1 as Cohen had used in responding to Senator
Sterling, which was the language that ultimately was added to the bill.141
In short, all three had the same goal in mind, and there is no indication
that any of them intended to insert the phrase “contracts of employment”
as a way of restricting the categories of workers who could claim the
exemption.
To be sure, one could argue that this legislative history cuts the other
way. In other words, because Piatt’s proposed language excluded the
phrase “contracts of employment,” but the adopted language included
“contracts of employment,” that indicates that the inclusion of that
language was intentional.142 While that is one possible reading, it does
not seem persuasive. The history suggests that Piatt, Cohen, and
Bernheimer were all working together with a common goal for both the
Act and the exemption, and that all three were attempting to exclude
disputes with workers from the bill—without regard to the worker’s legal
status as a common-law employee—in order to address the concerns that
various parties had expressed.143 Similarly, Secretary Hoover, who
supported arbitration because he thought it was appropriate for the
commercial setting to resolve business disputes,144 likely was not
deliberately seeking to rein in the scope of the exemption to apply only
to common-law employees and not to other workers. Moreover, the fact
138
139
140

Id. at 133–35.
Id. at 143.
See id. at 144–45 (“[I]t is very likely that Bernheimer suggested this amendment [to Hoover],
which is virtually the same amendment Cohen had drafted a few days earlier.”).
141 See id. at 135, 144–45; Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 1, 43 Stat. 883, 883
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
142 Cf. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 149–51 (1988) (looking to legislative history of
amendment process in interpreting the Social Security Act).
143 See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
144 See SZALAI, supra note 15, at 108–09 (quoting Hoover’s support for “the arbitration of
commercial disputes” and describing how the Commerce Department, under then-Secretary of
Commerce Hoover, had experimented with voluntary arbitration of disputes between British and
American merchants).

130

C ARD O Z O L AW RE VI EW D E• N O VO

[2018

that when Hoover proposed the amendment, he said that it was intended
to address objections about including “workers’ contracts” within the
FAA,145 strongly supports the idea that none of the drafters intended to
limit the exemption to only certain classes of workers, such as commonlaw employees. Thus, while the legislative history may not be crystal
clear, the fact that the drafters treated “contracts of employment”
synonymously with “workers” suggests that the phrase was not intended
to limit the reach of the exemption to common-law employees only.
B.

“Railroad Employees” and “Seamen”

The two types of workers specifically mentioned in the exemption
are “railroad employees” and “seamen.” Under the statutory canon of
ejusdem generis, which the Court has already said is an appropriate canon
for construing Section 1,146 the remaining term “workers engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce” should be interpreted in a similar vein to
those two more specific terms. Accordingly, if the terms “railroad
employees” and “seamen” were understood by Congress in 1925 to
include a wider range of workers then just common-law employees, the
term “workers” should also be read to include a wider range of workers
than just common-law employees. And an examination of the historical
record reveals that the terms “railroad employees” and “seamen” were
not limited to common-law employees.
The Circuit City Court concluded that Congress used the terms
“railroad employees” and “seamen” because it had already created
dispute resolution structures for railroad workers and seamen and thus
excluded those categories to avoid any duplication or overlap between
those statutory schemes.147 However, the scope of each of those dispute
resolution systems was not determined by whether the worker was a
common-law employee but swept more broadly to encompass
contractors, as well. This supports the conclusion that the Section 1
exemption is not limited to common-law employees.
1.

Railroad Employees

First, with respect to “railroad employees,” Congress created a
dispute resolution scheme for them in the Transportation Act of 1920.148
145
146
147

1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 14 (printing Hoover’s letter).
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001).
Id. at 121. Of course, as explained above, it is equally likely that those two categories were
included because two of the primary individuals who expressed concern about the Act’s
applicability to workers were an influential lawyer who represented railroad companies and the
President of the International Seaman’s Union.
148 Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456.
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The Transportation Act established the Railroad Labor Board (RLB), an
administrative body created to resolve wage disputes and other
grievances between railroad companies and their “employees” that could
not be resolved on an informal basis.149 Naturally, it was not long before
the question arose of who constituted an “employee” subject to the
Railroad Labor Board’s jurisdiction. Specifically, the Railroad Labor
Board was called on to determine whether workers who were not hired
directly by the railroad but were hired by a third-party contractor of the
railroad nonetheless constituted “employees.” The Board held
unequivocally that whether someone is an employee depends on the type
of work they do—i.e. whether their work contributes to the functioning
of the railroad—and not on who hires them.150 The Board specifically
rejected the argument that contract workers are not railroad employees,
stating:
When Congress in this Act speaks of railroad employees, it
undoubtedly contemplates those engaged in the customary work
directly contributory to the operation of the railroads. It is absurd to
say that carriers and their employees would not be permitted to
interrupt commerce by labor controversies unless the operation of the
roads was turned over to contractors, in which event the so-called
contractors and the railway workers might engage in industrial warfare
ad libitum . . . . A strike by the employees of a contractor or contractoragent of a carrier would as effectually result in an interruption to traffic
as if the men were the direct employees of the carrier.151

Thus, the Board clearly indicated that the phrase “railroad
employees” in the Transportation Act of 1920 was not limited to those
who were hired directly by the railroad and would satisfy the commonlaw definition of an employee, but that it applied equally to any worker
who “engaged in the customary work directly contributory to the
operation of the railroads” regardless of how they were labeled. This
directly supports the conclusion that the term “railroad employees” in
Section 1 was not meant to exclude independent contractors and limit
itself to those workers who meet the traditional definition of employee.
Rather, it reinforces the idea that Section 1 was focused on protecting
those workers who performed transportation work, regardless of how
their work relationship was characterized.
Indeed, reading the FAA to encompass independent contractors and
conclude that they fall outside Section 1’s exemption would cause the
very disruption that the Circuit City Court concluded Congress wanted to
prevent by excluding some categories of workers from Section 1. If
independent contractors were subject to the FAA, but also fell within the
Railroad Labor Board’s jurisdiction, then any dispute between railroad
149
150
151

Id. at §§ 300–316.
Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., No. 982, 3 R.L.B. 332 (1922).
Id. at 336–37.
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workers and their bosses would have been simultaneously subject to two
different dispute resolution schemes: the Railroad Labor Board process
and private arbitration. Allowing railroad companies or other businesses
to bypass the Railroad Labor Board simply by inserting an arbitration
clause in hiring contracts would have undermined the role Congress
intended the Railroad Labor Board to play in resolving railroad labor
disputes.
Moreover, Congress was likely aware of the Railroad Labor Board’s
decisions because the railroad strikes of the early Twentieth Century were
among the most public and pressing issues of the time, including in the
early 1920s right before the passage of the FAA.152 Indeed, Secretary
Hoover, whose letter in support of the FAA contained the language that
is now the Section 1 exemption, met with railroad leaders in 1922 to try
and resolve one such strike.153
While this is not the only possible interpretation of the term “railroad
employees,” it is more persuasive than the alternative. One possible
counter-argument is that other federal statutes relating to railroad workers
were limited to common-law employees and did not cover independent
contractors. For example, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),
enacted in 1908, allowed railroad employees to sue railroad companies
for injuries caused by the companies.154 Soon after its enactment, the
Supreme Court concluded that the statute did not extend to workers hired
by a third-party contractor.155 Similarly, the Railway Labor Act of 1926,
which replaced the Transportation Act of 1920, was limited to railroad
“employees.”156 But FELA is not relevant because it did not create a
separate dispute resolution scheme that would have interfered with the
FAA.157 Rather, it simply allowed railroad employees to use the courts to
seek a tort remedy against the railroad companies.158 And while the
152 See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235,
273 (2003); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM 1865–1925 403 (1987) (describing railroad strike of
1921); Margaret Gadsby, Strike of the Railroad Shopmen, 15 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 6 (Dec. 1922)
(describing railroad strike of 1922).
153 COLIN J. DAVIS, POWER AT ODDS: THE 1922 NATIONAL RAILROAD SHOPMEN’S STRIKE
104–09 (1997).
154 Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012)) (stating that “every common carrier by railroad . . . shall
be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier”).
155 See Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 92–94 (1915) (holding that porters
hired by the Pullman company to work on the Railroad could not sue under FELA because they
were not employees of the railroad and concluding that the statutory terms “employee” and
“employed” were “intended to describe the conventional relation of employer and employee”).
156 Railway Labor Act of 1926, c. 347, § 1, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 151
(2012)) (“The term ‘employee’ as used herein includes every person in the service of a carrier
(subject to its continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of rendition of his service)
who performs any work defined as that of an employee or subordinate official in the orders of the
Surface Transportation Board . . . .”).
157 See supra note 154. Cf. supra notes 123–126 and accompanying text.
158 See supra note 154.

2018] T H E FA A A N D I N D E PEN D E N T C O N T R A C T O RS 133
Railway Labor Act was mentioned by the Circuit City Court, it was
adopted in 1926, a year after the FAA became law. Given that the
Railway Labor Act was not the law at the time of the FAA’s passage, it
is questionable to assume that Congress would have intended for the term
“railroad employees” to be defined by reference to a statute not yet in
existence rather than by the Transportation Act, which still existed in
1925.159
In short, because (1) whether an individual was a “railroad
employee” subject to the Railroad Labor Board’s jurisdiction turned on
the type of work the person performed rather than on whether the person
met the legal definition of employee, and (2) the Board’s jurisdiction
extended equally to direct employees of a railroad as well as contractors,
the inclusion of “railroad employees” in Section 1’s exemption was
intended to cover all transportation workers and not just those that met
the common-law definition of an employee.
2.

Seamen

The inclusion of “seamen” within Section 1’s exemption provides
further evidence that the exemption should not be limited to common-law
employees but should include anyone who does transportation work
regardless of whether that person would be considered an employee or an
independent contractor. The most likely reason that “seamen” were
specifically mentioned in the exemption is that the main labor opposition
to the bill came from Andrew Furuseth, the head of the International
Seamen’s Union, who worried that seamen could be exploited and forced
into arbitration by the inclusion of arbitration clauses in shipping
articles.160 But his concern for all seamen, and Congress’s response in
159 Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66–152, 41 Stat. 456. Similarly, one could argue
that the Railroad Labor Board’s interpretation that its jurisdiction extended to workers hired by
third-party contractors in addition to workers hired directly by the railroads does not support
applying the FAA’s Section 1 exemption to independent contractors. That is because in both cases,
the workers were somebody’s employees, either the railroad or the contracting party, and thus were
not truly independent contractors. But the Railroad Labor Board also determined that individual
contractors, in addition to contracting companies, were within its jurisdiction when those
contractors performed railroad-related work. See United Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees & Ry.
Shop Laborers v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., No. 1230, 3 R.L.B. 700 (1922) (holding that
individual workers who contracted with railroads to serve as water pumpers were still the railroad’s
“employees” under the Transportation Act).
160 See, e.g., SZALAI, supra note 15, at 131–32 (describing Furuseth’s public opposition to the
bill and concern for seamen being required to go to arbitration); Analysis of H.R. 13522 Submitted
by President Andrew Furuseth to the Convention Which Was Adopted, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEAMAN’S UNION OF AMERICA
204 (1923) (quoting statement from Mr. Furuseth). The term “shipping articles” is a maritime term
of art that refers to the written terms of work between a seaman and a master. Federal law requires
that written shipping articles are provided and signed by a seaman before a voyage commences,
presumably as a way of limiting exploitation of seamen by their employers. See ROBERT FORCE &
MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 6.1 (5th ed. & Supp. 2017).
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excluding all seamen from the reach of the FAA, is instructive in several
ways. First, as with railroad employees, whether an individual is
considered a seaman is defined by the type of work the person does—
work contributing to the functioning of a vessel in navigation—and not
by the nature of the employment relationship. Accordingly, workers who
were hired by third-party contractors or who might qualify as independent
contractors under statutes in place at the time like the Jones Act could
still be considered seaman as long as they performed maritime-related
work. Second, the dispute resolution system that Congress created for
seamen in the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872 was not limited to
common-law employees but covered any member of a ship’s crew.
Because the term “seamen” can encompass all different types of work
relationships and is not limited to common-law employees, Section 1’s
exemption similarly should not be limited to common-law employees.
Just as with “railroad employees,” whether an individual qualified
as a seaman depended on the type of work that person did and not on who
hired them. The common understanding of the term “seaman” was that it
included anyone who did work contributing to the functioning of the
vessel.161 Thus, the term seaman encompassed any member of a ship’s
crew.162
In other words, any person working aboard a ship was a seaman. It
did not matter whether the person was hired directly by the shipowner or
by a third-party contractor, nor what the specific terms of the employment
relationship were. Indeed, like in the railroad context, early cases
demonstrate that workers hired by third-parties rather than by shipowners
were still seamen. For example, in 1916, a wireless operator who worked
and was paid for by the Marconi company and who worked on a ship “in
pursuance of a contract between [the ship’s] owners and the Marconi
Wireless Telegraph Company of America” was determined to be a
seaman.163 That court cited to an earlier decision that explained that a
seaman’s status was determined by the work the person performs,
“without reference to the nature of the arrangement under which they are
on board.”164 Because it was the nature of the work, rather than the nature
of the contract, that determined seaman status, anyone working in
furtherance of a vessel, pursuant to any type of contractual arrangement,
qualified as a seaman.165 The term seaman was not restricted to those
161 In McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991), the Supreme Court extensively
reviewed the historical understanding of the term seaman and concluded from those historical
sources that in the early Twentieth Century, around the time the FAA was passed, the term
“seaman” included anyone who contributed to the functioning of a vessel. Id. at 346–49.
162 See id. at 348 (explaining that a “member of a crew” and “seaman” were “closely-related
terms” that “were often used interchangeably in general maritime cases”).
163 The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 798–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
164 Id. at 798 (quoting The Bound Brook, 146 F. 160, 164 (D. Mass. 1906)).
165 See The Marie, 49 F. 286, 287 (D. Or. 1892). In that case, the court explained that the type
of contract involved was irrelevant. Id. (“The crew of a vessel,—the ship’s company,—in a general
sense comprises all persons who, in pursuance of some contract or arrangement with the owner or
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persons meeting the common-law definition of an employee.
This broad interpretation of “seaman” is consistent with the way
federal statutes in various contexts define seaman—namely as not limited
to employees only. Current maritime statutes define seaman broadly to
encompass individuals “engaged or employed in any capacity on board a
vessel.”166 Similarly, at the time the FAA was passed, the Shipping
Commissioners Act stated that “every person (apprentices excluded) who
shall be employed or engaged to serve in any capacity on board the
[vessel] shall be deemed and taken to be a ‘seaman.’”167 The fact that the
definition refers to those “employed or engaged” (rather than just
“employed”), and working “in any capacity,” indicates that the term
“seaman” was not limited to employees or persons “employed” on the
vessel.168
The structure of the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872 supports
this conclusion.169 This statute created a dispute resolution scheme for
disputes involving seamen that, according to the Circuit City court,
Congress intended to preserve when crafting the Section 1 exemption.
The statute created a shipping commissioner and authorized that
commissioner to arbitrate disputes and issue final, binding decisions. The
scope of disputes that the shipping commissioner could hear was broad,
as the statute covered “any question whatsoever . . . between a master,
consignee, agent or owner, and any of his crew.”170 The Act did not limit
the Commissioner’s jurisdiction to employees, nor did it use the term
“employee.”171 Rather, it covered any dispute involving a member of the
crew, which as explained above, was synonymous with seaman and
included anyone who worked in support of the vessel’s function. Given
that the Shipping Commissioners Act did not distinguish between
common-law employees and other maritime workers, and given that
Congress did not want the FAA to interfere with Shipping Commissioner
arbitration, it stands to reason that Congress also did not intend Section
1’s exemption to distinguish between common-law employees and other
transportation workers.
master, are on board the same, aiding in the navigation thereof. It matters not whether the contract
is verbal or in writing, or for a long or short voyage or period.”). While the court was specifically
talking about the length of the contract or oral versus written contracts, it also emphasized that
anyone performing seaman’s duties pursuant to any type of contractual arrangement was a seaman.
Id.
166 46 U.S.C. § 10101(3) (2012) (emphasis added). This definition excludes “scientific
personnel, a sailing school instructor, or a sailing school student.” Id.
167 Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, § 65, 17 Stat. 262, 277.
168 Some later-enacted statues, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), define “seaman”
more narrowly, but still by reference to the nature of the work performed rather than the individual’s
employment status. See 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 (2018).
169 Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, § 25, 17 Stat. 262, 267.
170 Id. For a more detailed look at the Shipping Commissioners Act, see Brief of Amici Curiae
Historians in Support of Respondent, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, No. 17-340 (U.S. July 25, 2018),
at 16–25.
171 Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, 17 Stat. 262.
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Notably, when Congress wanted to use employment-specific
terminology in maritime statutes, it knew how to do so. In the Jones Act
of 1920, Congress created a negligence cause of action for any “seaman
who shall suffer injury in the course of his employment.”172 Because the
text of this provision incorporated the standards from FELA with respect
to railroad employees,173 the Jones Act has been held to apply only to
employees. The Shipping Commissioners Act, by contrast, was not
limited to conduct occurring in the course of employment.174 Since that
one section of the Jones Act is the only provision of the Act to explicitly
reference an employee or “employment,” it follows that the rest of the
Act, and the meaning of the term “seaman,” is not limited to employeremployee relationships.175
Although advocates of limiting Section 1’s exemption only to
common-law employees have pointed to this provision of the Jones Act
for support,176 it may actually cut in the other direction by showing that
independent contractors can be seamen. Because this one provision of the
Jones Act uses employment-specific language, courts applying that
portion of the Jones Act have been called on to determine whether
particular seamen are employees (in which case they can sue under the
Jones Act) or independent contractors (in which case they cannot). Courts
have found various maritime workers to be independent contractors, even
though they also qualify as seamen based on the work they perform. For
example, several courts have found that harbor pilots—who have
expertise in particular harbors and are brought on board to steer ships
through those waters—are independent contractors under the Jones

172 Jones Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A App. § 688(a)
(2006)).
173 See id. (stating that in any personal injury action brought under the Jones Act, “all statutes
of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees shall apply”); Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co. S.A.G., 4 F.3d 207,
215 (3d Cir. 1993) (“In this respect, the Act is the maritime equivalent of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (‘FELA’) covering railroad employees.”).
174 The Act covered “any question whatsoever” between a master and a crewmember. Shipping
Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, § 25, 17 Stat. 262, 267.
175 See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”) (quoting U.S. v. Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
176 See Brief for Petitioner, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, No. 17-340 (U.S. May 14, 2018), at 26.
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Act.177 Yet harbor pilots have long been recognized as seaman.178 The
same is true for divers, who qualify as seamen179 but have been found to
be independent contractors under the Jones Act.180
To be sure, one could argue that if using the term “employment” in
conjunction with seamen (as in the Jones Act) is sufficient to limit a
provision’s scope to common-law employees, then Section 1’s use of
“contracts of employment” for “seamen” and other transportation
workers should be similarly limited to common-law employees. That is
possible, but that conclusion is undermined by two important facts. First,
the term “contracts of employment” was not understood at the time to be
limited to employees. Second, the scope of Shipping Commissioner
arbitration was not limited to employer-employee disputes and
Congress’s goal was to exempt anyone who could bring a dispute before
the Shipping Commissioner.
Finally, the fact that admiralty jurisdiction is determined by the
subject matter of the dispute rather than the status of the parties provides
additional support for reading Section 1’s exemption to cover all
transportation workers, regardless of whether they are contractors or
common-law employees. The FAA’s legislative history suggests that
Congress wanted, through Section 1, to keep the FAA from encroaching
into matters that fall within admiralty jurisdiction. In an early decision
addressing Section 1’s exemption, the Third Circuit examined this
legislative history, explaining that the FAA was drafted by an ABA
committee, and that in a 1923 ABA report, that committee stated:
Objections to the bill were urged by Mr. Andrew Furuseth as
representing the Seamen’s Union, Mr. Furuseth taking the position
that seamen’s wages came within admiralty jurisdiction and should
not be subject to an agreement to arbitrate. In order to eliminate this
opposition, the committee consented to an amendment to Section 1 as
177 See, e.g., Evans, 4 F.3d at 217; Harwood v. Partredereit AF 15.5.81, 944 F.2d 1187, 1189
(4th Cir. 1991) (finding that a compulsory harbor pilot who was a member of the Virginia Pilots’
Association functioned as an independent contractor); Bach v. Trident Shipping Co., 708 F. Supp.
772, 773–74 (E.D. La. 1988) (holding a compulsory pilot to be an independent contractor), aff’d
on other grounds, 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 500 U.S. 949, reaff’d on
other grounds, 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir.); Clark v. Solomon Navigation, Ltd., 631 F. Supp. 1275,
1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that the parties agreed that a compulsory river pilot who worked for
his own company, which was in turn a member of a local pilots’ association, was an independent
contractor and not employee of the shipowner in a suit brought by the pilot solely under general
maritime law). But see Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399, 407 (1906) (holding that, in a negligence
action by a shipowner against members of a pilots’ association for negligence of the association’s
compulsory pilot, the association was not liable because it had no control over the shipboard job
performance of its members).
178 See, e.g., The China 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53, 67 (1868) (referring to pilots as “seamen”).
179 See, e.g., The Murphy Tugs, 28 F. 429 (E.D. Mich. 1886) (“There can be no question in this
case that the services rendered by libelant were maritime in their nature . . . .”); The Highlander, 12
F. Cas. 136, (D. Mass. 1859); De Gaetano v. Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co., 196
N.Y.S. 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922).
180 See, e.g., Williamson v. Daspit Bros. Marine Divers, Inc., 337 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1964)
(upholding jury verdict finding that diver hired by a third-party was an independent contractor).
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follows: “but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”181

Under standard principles of admiralty law, admiralty jurisdiction
over contractual disputes is based on “the subject matter of the contract”
and whether it refers to maritime services or transactions.182 “It is
inappropriate, therefore, to focus on the status of a claimant to determine
whether admiralty jurisdiction exists.”183 Thus, if the subject matter of a
contract brings the dispute within admiralty jurisdiction, it does not
matter if the services are performed by a shipping company or by a thirdparty contractor.184 Because Section 1’s exemption was intended to avoid
any encroachment on traditional maritime jurisdiction over seaman’s
disputes, and because jurisdiction does not disappear because of a party’s
status as a contractor, Section 1’s exemption also should not exclude
transportation workers just because of their status as contractors.
Just as with railroad employees, the inclusion of the term
“seamen”—a term that was determined by the subject matter of the work
performed rather than by the employment status of the worker—
reinforces the idea that Section 1’s exemption was intended to cover all
transportation workers, regardless of whether the person performing the
transportation work would satisfy the legal definition of an employee or
would be labeled an independent contractor.
V. POLICY CONCERNS
In addition to the statutory text and the legislative history, policy
concerns also favor applying Section 1’s exemption to all transportation
workers. First, applying the exemption to common-law employees but
not to independent contractors would thwart Congress’ concern with
promoting labor peace in transportation industries and ensuring the free
flow of goods. As the Circuit City Court found, the Section 1 exemption
grew out of “Congress’ demonstrated concern with transportation
workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods.”185
Transportation workers who are independent contractors can disrupt “the
free flow of goods” just as easily as can any other transportation worker.
That was precisely the reason that the Railroad Labor Board determined
181 Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. & Radio Mach. Workers of Am., (U.E.) Local 437, 207
F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953) (quoting 48 Am. Bar Ass’n Rep. 287 (1923)).
182 Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 610 (1991) (quoting Ins. Co. v.
Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 26 (1871)).
183 Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 612.
184 See id. at 609–13 (holding that fuel services supplied by a third-party contractor of Exxon
fell within admiralty jurisdiction and were no different than maritime services provided by Exxon
itself).
185 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001).
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that its jurisdiction should cover all railroad workers.186 Indeed, many
labor disputes involve independent contractors, or involve the very
question of whether particular workers are misclassified under applicable
law as independent contractors rather than employees.187 If Section 1’s
exemption was motivated to promote labor peace and thereby ensure the
“free flow of goods,” its purpose would not be fulfilled if it excluded
independent contractors.
Second, applying the exemption to both employees and independent
contractors reduces the incentives for companies to purposely mislabel
their workers as independent contractors. “[T]he misclassification of
employees as independent contractors” is “one of the most serious
problems facing affected workers, employers and the entire economy.”188
Millions of employees are wrongly classified as independent contractors.
While some misclassification is accidental, much of it is intentional.
Employers have strong incentives to misclassify employees as
independent contractors. By labeling a hired worker as an independent
contractor, employers can cut costs because they can bypass important
statutory protections for workers. “Misclassified employees often are
denied access to critical benefits and protections to which they are
entitled, such as the minimum wage, overtime compensation, family and
medical leave, unemployment insurance, and safe workplaces.”189 Of
relevance to the Oliveira case now before the Supreme Court, there is
especially “pervasive misclassification in the trucking industry,”
resulting from industry deregulation and the heavy use of purportedly
“self-employed drivers.”190 The high-level of exploitation of truck drivers
in particular and transportation workers in general has been welldocumented.191
Make no mistake, that is what the case now before the Court is really
about. Worker’s rights have taken a beating at the hands of the Supreme
Court recently. Just this year, the Court has drastically curtailed the
ability of unions to fund themselves through dues collection192 and has
held that companies can force employees to sign away their rights to
engage in class actions or collective activity, even if it makes it
impossible for them to vindicate their rights or collectively work to
improve the terms and conditions of their employment.193 With the
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See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Syst., Inc., 765763 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014);
CARRÉ, supra note 8, at 11–12 (describing trucking practices and ensuing labor disputes).
188 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 6.
189 Id.
190 CARRÉ, supra note 8, at 11.
191 See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, Alone on the Open Road: Truckers Feel Like ‘Throwaway People’,
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/us/trucking-jobs.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/EP9C-L5TB.
192 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
193 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (finding that the FAA requires enforcement
of arbitration clauses in employment contracts that ban collective actions, and that such clauses do
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retirement of Justice Kennedy and the potential for a replacement who is
not particularly sympathetic to the plight of workers, the prospect of
future restrictions on workers’ rights looms large. Although much of the
case briefs and argument may focus on esoteric points about the historical
meaning of certain statutory terms, the case represents another corporate
attempt to expand arbitration, diminish workers’ abilities to collect
needed wages and benefits, and take advantage of a vulnerable sector of
the American workplace. If we truly wish to combat employer
misclassification of workers as independent contractors, then we should
stop providing employers with incentives to do so. While it may not stop
misclassification entirely, it will at least provide that certain misclassified
workers can still challenge their treatment in a court of law instead of
being forced by their employers into private arbitration against their will.
CONCLUSION
Congress exempted from the FAA all contracts of employment with
workers engaged in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has already
narrowed the scope of the exemption once when it limited the exemption
to transportation workers. It is now poised to decide whether the
exemption is limited only to those transportation workers who meet the
legal definition of an employee, excluding millions of transportation
workers who are labeled independent contractors or who work in other
non-traditional structures. If the Court so holds, it will enable and
incentivize companies to purposely misclassify their workers as
independent contractors, exacerbating a problem that is already endemic.
However, and although the historical evidence is not ironclad, a close
examination of the statute’s text, legislative history, and policy concerns
underlying the FAA support interpreting Section 1’s exemption to cover
all transportation workers, including independent contractors, more than
it supports limiting the exemption to common-law employees.

not violate the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) prohibition on restricting collective activity
regarding the terms and conditions of employment).

